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Current recommendations for acquisition reform call for 
the creation of a process more like that of the conunercial 
sector by converting from a cost - based to a pri ce -based 
system. This process would increase reliance on competition 
as a tool to regulate prices, instead of requiring extensive 
cost or pricing data. 
Yet, the decline in defense procurement spending is 
causing a related decrease in the s ize of the defense industry 
base. In some cases sole source situations are being created . 
Given a lack of competition in these situations, how can the 
Government ensure that the contractor is charging a fair and 
reasonable price? 
One particular model that shows some potential usefulness 
was created in 1982 by David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson. 
They developed an economic model for regulating the prices 
set by monopolists , whose exact costs are unknown to the 
regulator. (Ref . 1] If this model can be adapted for 
use in the DOD procurement process, it may provide a valuable 
method of risk reduction while operating in a price -based 
system . 
Past research has studied this model strictly in the 
context of using a uniform probabi lity distribution. However, 
other probability distributions are feasible. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
This study focuses on developing a method of comparing the 
use of a triangular distribution to the uniform distribution 
with the Baron-Myerson model. It also identifies the current 
trends in DOD acquisition reforms and discusses 
implications of using the model in defense procurement. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The principal research question was: Could the Baron -
Myerson model be used in DOD procurement as a price regulating 
tool under a price-based procurement process? 
Subsidiary research questions were: 
What conditions or parameters determine t he best 
distribution to use between the uniform or triangular 
distribution? 
2. What conditions are necessary for best use of the 
model as a price regulating tool? 
3. Do favorable conditions exist in DOD prOCurements for 
use of the Baron-Myerson model? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The study identifies the current trends in the acquisition 
reform movement and recommendations being made for change to 
the DOD procurement process. In particula r , it focuses upon 
the recommended shift from a cost-based to a pr.ice-based 
purchasing system. It develops a method for reducing the risk 
involved in selecting an underlying probabiJ ity distribution 
for the Baron-Myerson model. The study then identifies the 
demand conditions under which the model might best be used and 
discusses whether these situations exist in the DOD 
procurement arena. The study does not, however, attempt to 
outline any detailed impl ementation plan for DOD. 
One I imi tat ion of doing research on the potential use of 
the model into DOD procurement was that the model is 
relatively unknown and not easily explained in a b rief time 
period. This limited personal and telephonic interviews to 
more general questions about the demand conditions required 
for use of the model. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study was accomplished by two primary means. The 
first step was to compare the model when using the c:niform or 
triangular distribution. The Baron-Myerson model was 
constructed mathematical l y using bo th a uniform and a 
triangular distribution. A spreadsheet program was then 
developed to conduct comparative analysis of the model 
perfonnance using both distributions. The second step was to 
identify if demand conditions exist in DOD purchasing that 
might allow use of the model as a price regulating tool. This 
step focused around detennining if cases existed where the DOD 
deIT.and was not totally inflexible. Personal and telephonic 
interviews were conducted to question practitioners in this 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapt er II presents as background the impetus behind 
current recorrunendations for acquisition refonn. It d iscusses 
how the reliance upon competition as a price regulating 
mechanism may be restricted by the downsizing of the defense 
industry base. 
Chapter III introduces the origins of the Baron-Myerson 
model and explains its use with both the unifonn and 
triangular distribution. It concludes with a risk analysis of 
the buyer's choice of probability distributions. 
Chapter IV discusses the conditions for best use of the 
model. It then examines whether or not these conditions exist 
in DOD procurement. 
Chapter V presents conclusions and recorrunendations of the 
study along with areas that might merit further research. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The amount of money availabl e for U.S. defense procurement 
spending has declined sharply since the mid 1980' s. 
Necessari l y, the inefficiency that has existed as an integral 
part of the Department Of Defense acquisition process can no 
longer be tolerated . One recommended solution is the adoption 
of more commercial practices in Government purchasing. More 
specifically , the Government needs to shift away from a cost-
based to a price - based process. 
This proposed shift creates uneasiness for many because it 
would neutralize many of the statutes and policies current l y 
used to maintain the public trust. More unsettling, the use 
of competition may not be available in all cases due to the 
decreasing nwnber of suppliers in many areas of the defense 
market. How, then, can the Government make this change and 
still protect the interests of the taxpayers? 
In 1982 David P. Baron and Roger Myerson developed a 
model for regulating a monopolist whose costs are unknown to 
the regulator. Selec t ive use of this model by the Department 
of Defense may assist in carrying out some of these 
acquisition process reforms . To better understand how the 
model might be of use, it is necessary to consider the current 
acquisition process, the forces prompting its cha nge, and the 
overriding need to maintain the public trust under a new 
system. 
This chapter provides initial background discussion of the 
need for acquisition process refonn. It identifies p::-oblems 
with the present cost - based pricing system and addresses how 
forces in the defense economy encourage sale source 
situations. Finally, it explains how relying on competition 
for pri ce control can create a dilerruna for buyers in the 
current defense economic environment. 
B. ACQUISITION PROCESS REFORM 
1. System Inefficiency 
It is commonly acknowledged that the defense 
acquisition process in the United States has become slow and 
inefficient. Layers of oversight, checks and balances, and 
segmentations of responsibility have intentionally been built 
into the system to prevent anyone person or group from 
gaining too much authority or power over any aspect of the 
p:::.-ocess. 
The regulatory and statutory policies in place in the 
system are also detrimental to efficiency. In the words of 
the Deputy undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Refonn, 
Colleen Pres ton: 
.. a myriad of laws and regulations were adopted over 
time -for laudable reasons--in an effort to address every 
possible contingency that might arise. to protect the 
Government's interests, to ensure the Government 
acquisition proces,s is fair, as, a chec~ on the 
Government's authorlty and demands on lts suppllers. 
further a social objective. [Ref. 2 ] 
2. New Challenges 
In the past, this process inefficiency was accepted as 
the price paid to maintain the public trust. Nonetheless, by 
1997 the defense budget will have decl i ned by 41 percent 
compared to its high in the 1980's. By fiscal year 1998, it 
wi l l have fa l len to three percent of GNP as opposed to the 
mid-1980's figure of six percent. [Ref. 2 ] Most of these 
budget cuts, 60 to 65 percent, will be in procurement. 
[Ref. 3] 
Other chal l enges exist aside from the budget cuts. 
The defense industry base is shrinking and the world markets 
are becoming more competitive. Technology is evol ving faster; 
and the cOln.'1Iercial markets are increasingly driving state-of -
the art technologies. If the United States expects to 
maintain a technologically superior force, it must find ways 
to keep its industries efficient and competitive, effectively 
integrate commercial and defense industries, and reduce the 
acquisition cycle time for procuring new weapon systems. 
The aggregate effect of these developments and 
challenges is such that Ms. Preston says, 
The world in which DOD now must operate has changed beyond 
the limits of the existing acquisition system's ability to 
adjust or evolve. It is not enough to improve the 
existing system, we need a fundamental rethinking and 
reinvention of the acquisition system if we are to be able 
to respond to the demands of the next decade. [Ref. 2J 
3. Commi tment To Change 
Changes occurring until now have been incremental in 
Simultaneous calls for reform from members of the 
current administration, Congress, and prominent advisory 
groups signal that momentum exists for more revolutionary 
changes. 
The Executive Branch is certainly backing reforms. In 
September of ~993, Vice President Gore unveiled his plan for 
streamlining Government and cutting costs. The following 
month President Clinton endorsed a u.S. Senate plan to reform 
acquisition. 
Congress is also showing its desire for reform. Many 
legislators from both sides of Congress are introducing bills 
to eliminate or modify existing acquisition laws. These bills 
currently include: S .1587, The Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1993, H.R. 2238, H.R. 3400, and H.R. 3586. 
[Ref. 4] 
However, the largest sources of recommendations for 
change in the last year have been the DOD Advisory Panel on 
Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law, or "800 Panel", 
and the Defense Science Board (OSB). 
The Congressionally ordered Section 800 Panel review 
focused on identifying where changes to acquisitio:1 laws were 
needed. The study by the Defense Science Board Task Force On 
Acquisition Reform was com:nissioned by the Undersecretary of 
DeEense (Acquisition) and examined a more comprehensive range 
of areas. Al though the origin of these two bodies 
different, they reached many of the same conclusions. 
C. CHANGING THE COST-BASED SYSTEM 
Both the Section 800 Panel and the DSB strongly agreed 
that the Government must adopt a more cOlllr:"lercial approach to 
aCq'"Jisition. Specifically, the two groups stated the need to 
shift from a cost-based to a price-based system. 
Speaking of the current cost-based system, the Section 800 
Panel wrote that, 
One of the most expensive and disruptive requirements 
involves mandatory adherence to cost principles and 
accounting standards enumerated in statute, in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and by the Cost Accounting 
Standards Board (CASB). [Ref. 5] 
The DSB was even more exact in its criticism of the 
system stating that, "The most important single 
intrusive element of the current process is the cost-based 
contracting system." [Ref. 6] The report l ists many 
of the problems triggered by this process: 
• Imposition of an array of unique reporting and oversight 
• systems which are incompatible with conunercially 
competitive enterprises. 
• The requirement t o provide and cert ify cost or pricing 
data. 
• Unique cost accounting systems. [Ref . 6) 
1. Truth In Negotiations a nd Co s t Accountin g Stan dards 
Much of the inefficiencies and resulting costs borne 
by Industry and Government come from requirements of the Truth 
In Negotiations Act (TINA) and extensive cost accounting 
standards (CAS). 
TINA , or Public Law 87-653 , currently requires that 
contractors mus t provide certified CDst and pricing data for 
all negotiated contracts in excess of $500 , 000 dollars and for 
those u nder $500,000 deemed necessary by the contracting 
officer. TINA provi des that the requirement for obtaining 
certified cost or pricing data i n support of a proposed price 
need not be applied to contracts or subcontracts where the 
price negotiat ed is based on adequate price competition or 
established catalog or market prices of conunercial items sold 
in substantial quant i ties to the general public . 
Industry leaders realized qu ickly that TINA was 
inefficient and protested that the cost of complying with its 
requirements were excessive. At a symposium held in 1968 to 
discuss the effects of TINA , one indus t ry representa t ive 
pointed out; 
10 
... a general increase in the administrative overhead. of 
both primes and subs is essential if we are to accompll~h 
all of the tasks that we are asked to perform under Publlc 
Law 87-653. We are having to spend more nan hours, hlre 
more people, and develop new systems for co~l~c~ing. data 
and laying an audit trail .. All of these a~tlvltle: lmply 
a much heavier administratlve burden and lncreasea costs 
in doing Government business. This is obviously a step in 
the wrong direction. [Ref. 7] 
2. Costs Of TINA And CAS 
Higher Administration Costs 
The predictions of higher costs under TINA have 
come true, as evidenced by several recent studies. 
example, the Office of Technology Assessment reports studies 
showing that the entire regulatory regime adds 10 to 50 
percent to the cost of doing business with the Government. 
[Ref. 8] A 1992 Defense Systems r.'.anagement College 
(DSMC) had reported costs associated with Government sales 
were roughly four times those associated with those to 
cormnercial customers. The DSMC data further showed that for 
every employee in a comparable position in a cormnercial 
division of the company, the Government division employed: 
eight people in accounting; in purchasing and 
subcontracting; 12 in auditing, and two in legal department. 
[Ref. 6] 
A Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) Survey of companies indicated that there was a pattern 
to suggest cormnercia l business spends five to ten percent of 
sales on administrative costs compared to 20 to 30 percent for 
their defense segments. Another eSIS study reported that a 
major corporation's defense division had 10,000 more staff 
than its commercial division to administer half the business 
volume the cost of the added employees alone was $750 
million. [Ref. 6J 
b. Barrier To Commercial Vendors And New Technology 
The Section 800 Panel was repeatedly told that 
companies that sell primarily to the commercial market do not 
have the accounting systems that will pennit them to provide 
the detailed cost or pricing da t a required by TINA. Cases of 
commercial companies refusing to do business with DOD due to 
the costs are cam.'l1on. One case illustrates the problem: 
A large company was planning to introduce a radio with 
special encryption features sought by DOD and law 
e nforcement agencies _ The item had not yet been sold in 
substantial quantities to the public _ Because of 
complicated laws and regulations governing the non-
competitive acquisition of new commercial products and 
technologies that haven't been sold in substantial 
quantities to the public, Pederal Government buyers were 
reluctant to purchase the product without requiring cost 
and pricing data. The company would not sell the item to 
the Government if it had to generate and provide cost and 
pricing data to support the price it is charging, which it 
did not do to establish the commercial price _ Thus, the 
Government continued to buy a less advanced old technology 
system, while commercial customers bought state-of-the-
art. [Ref. 9] 
c. Loss of current Defense Contractors 
Many companies that have already been selling to 
the Government are leaving the defense arena. A 1990 workshop 
at DSMC on "Why Pirms are Leaving the Defense Market" 
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identified reasons why f.irms left or were planning to end 
business relations with the DOD. AIr.ong them were: 
• audit procedures inconsistent with those typical l y used by 
industry 
• excessive costs of doing business with DOD 
• proliferation of regulations 
• unnecessary calls for pr~c ing data 
[Ref. 10] 
As Ms. Preston concludes: 
The combined net effect of these laws, regulations, and 
practices is a system which; adds unnecessary costs to the 
products of defense contractors, making i t harder for them 
to be competitive in the commercial marketplace, prevents 
the Government from acquiring products from commercial 
contractors unwilling to change their practices to 
accommodate rules unique to Government contractors, and 
adds to DOD's cost of doing business--its 'management and 
control' costs. [Ref. 2] 
Ms. Preston's Strategic Plan For Acquisition 
Reform asserts that the DOD must "transition from a cost-based 
to a price - based system." [Ref. 21 
3. Suggestions For Change 
Transitioning from cost-based to a price-based system 
increases the risk to the Government. Making the change will 
require the use of mechanisms other than CAS and TINA to 
maintain the public trust. Both the Section 800 Panel and the 
DSB have recommended actions necessary to make this change. 
The Section 800 Panel believes that, 
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By fa;r-, the largest portion of commercial items 
acquisltions wil l be able to be conducted through 
competltion as defined in 10 U.S.C. Subsections 2302 and 
2304 and in section four of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. Subsection 403 (6) or on 
the basi,s of established catalog or market prices as 
defined ln the FAR(FAR 15.804-3(c)). [Ref. 5] 
The DSB also recognizes the need to protect the public 
interest under any changes and seems confident that is 
possible. It does not see a change from the present system as 
a large risk since it contends that, 
... the public protection offered by the current system is 
not a very high standard. It encourages the supplier to 
increase the cost of goods because that is one of the few 
ways available to increase profit over the long run. It 
discourages a supplier from investing in more efficient 
production processes. It creates an immense regime of 
contention between the Government and its suppliers around 
which large numbers of Government auditors, accountants, 
and other overseers scrirmnage with an equally large number 
of supplier personnel. The result is a constant flow of 
charges and counter charges about false claims, 
unallowable costs, pricing deficiencies, and a host of 
other opportunities for differences which we believe can 
safely be avoided. It is very clear that the effect of 
this is not public trust. [Ref. 6] 
They go on to say , 
We believe that even after monitoring cost is removed as 
a contractual entit lement, there remain several strong and 
effective tools available to the Government. [Ref. 6J 
Some of the tools listed by the DSB include using: 
• a fonnal, collective and accountable judgment of fair 
price using market surveys of similar products; 
14 
• the general regula tory environment governing the conduct 
of commercial business, including comr:tercial accounting 
and audit practices; 
• continued emphasis on the broad use of corr.petition. 
[Ref. 6 J 
MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC TRUST: A DILEMMA 
Unfortunately, the very timing of the proposed acquisition 
reforms may actually restrict the use of competition as a 
technique for price regulation. The decrease in defense 
procurement spending in the United States is promoting a 
corresponding decrease in the defense industria l base. Thus, 
at precisely the time DOD is trying to foster more 
competition, the number of its suppliers is decreasing. 
some supplier categories, there may only be one source left. 
The di lemma for the Government then becomes whether or not to 
maintain more than one supplier for an item or service . 
This section discusses trends in the defense economy 
leading to sale source situat ions . It then addresses the 
propensity to encourage competition even when it is less 
efficient than a sole source si t uation . 
1. Towards Sole Sourcing 
Competition may not always be the most efficient 
method by which to execute a contract. I ndeed, it can be 
impossible to have competition under some circumstances . 
l5 
a. Destructive Competi tion 
In industries a phenomena known as 
destructive competition may exist. This condition is 
characterized by a large amount of overcapacity that cannot be 
quiCkly downsized, coupled with a sharp and prolonged decrease 
in demand. [Ref. 11] If demand remains low for an 
extended period, all but the low cost producer will eventually 
leave the market. 
The conditions described above closely resemble 
the current DOD procurement environment. Many of these 
industries are highly capitalized, and not quickly converted 
to other uses. The rapid decrease in Government demand for 
these products drives unit costs up as overhead burden is 
spread over the smaller product base. This combination is 
reducing the number of items DOD procures annually and forcing 
many contractors out of business. Often, only one source 
remains in a sector. 
b. Proprietary Techno~o9Y 
Another factor creating Bole source situations is 
the rapid change in technology. As new innovations are made, 
companies retain patents giving them sole proprietorship of a 
product or process. In these cases, it is impossible 
create a second source without expensive licensing or 
purchasing of data rights. 
16 
2. Resistance To Sale Sourcing 
The Competition In Contracting Act (CICA}, or Public 
Law 89 369, is a ma jor deterrent to sale source contracts. 
CICA mandates that Government agencies wil l carry out all 
procurement:s under full and open competi ticnl. 
competition may not be appropriate for all situations, 
however, and may bring with it certain undesirable 
inefficiencies. As one wr ite r puts it: 
The strong policy expressed in CICA seems to assume that 
some benefit (e .g., cost savings, innovationl will follow 
competition in every case , even when extreme measures are 
needed to increase the number of competitors .... There is 
concern that the statute encourages competition for 
competition's sake, regardless of other effects . 
[Ref. l2 ) 
The policy of full and open competition is "applied 
with vigor, even when pragmatic assessments indicate that 
competition will not be cost effective." [Re f. l2J 
somet i mes two suppliers are each given a part of the total 
purchase to maintain two competitive sources. This can be 
very inefficient. A handbook for program managers states 
that: 
. if the system developer possesses excess capacity , 
splitting the production run may increase costs t.hrough 
increased overhead per unit. [Ref. ~ 3 J 
CICA a llows agencies to conduct procurement using 
other than full and open competition only under certain 
circumstances . The FAR Subpart 6.3 states these in detail. 
17 
Other inefficiencies may result including: production 
of economically inefficient quantities, higher contract 
ad.'TIinistration costs, quality differences, configuration 
management difficulties, and technical or proprietary data 
rights problems. 
3. Solving The Dilemma 
The intent to use competition for price regulation 
will work in most procurements because an adequate number of 
suppliers are available to compete. However, where 
competition is impossible or impractical , there still remains 
a problem. 
As mentioned earlier, The Baron-Myerson model may 
offer an alternative. Under the correct conditions, the model 
may help DOD maintain the public trust when competition is not 
feasible. 
The following chapter will discuss the underlying 
principles of the Baron-Myerson model and the history of its 
development. However, the reader must be reminded that what 
follows is not a detailed implementation plan for use of the 
Baron-Myerson model by DOD. 
III. THE BARON-MYERSON MODEL 
A. I NTRODUCTION 
Baron and Myerson developed an economic model for 
regulating prices set by monopolists whose exact costs are 
unknown to the regulator. The objective of the regulator 
using the Baron-Myerson mode l is to maximize social welfare, 
or total surplus, of the transaction as a weighted function of 
consumer surplus and producer's profit. [Ref. 1] 
The model assumes the condition that the producer does not 
share his known opportunity cost infonnation with the 
regulator. At the same t ime , the Government cannot find out 
information about the producer's opportunity costs. This 
assumption of information asymmetry may be appropriate for 
many defense contractors; where opportunity costs of 
production are hardly known to the Government even after the 
production is over. 
Within the Baron-Myerson framework, one can maximize the 
expected Government gain while induc ing the contractor to 
reveal his true costs. Here, Government gain is the amount of 
consumer surplus the Government retains when purchasing a 
quantity of items. 
This chapter explains the origin and underlying principles 
of the model. It shows the application af the model using the 
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uniform distribution. It then applies the triangular 
distribution to the model. Finally, it concludes with 
analysis to determine what factors might influence the choice 
of the distribution when the regulator cannot, a priori, 
decide the appropriate form of the distribution. 
ORIGIN OF THE MODEL 
While Baron and Myerson's model is uniquely their own, its 
de facto truth revelation strategy may be traced back to 
earlier l iterature. To better understand the Baron-Myerson 
model, it is helpful to discuss the evolution of its 
underlying principles. 
1. Naive Approach 
Consider the situation where the producer is a 
monopolist. Assume the Government cannot verify the 
producer's costs, but treats the producer's cost report as 
genuine and bases its purchasing decision on the report. 
This characterization may not be too far off from many 
defense procurement situations where there is little 
competition and it is difficult for the Government to find the 
producer's true opportunity costs. This situation may become 
more realistic as the defense budget declines and fewer 
resources are allocated in cost estimation and verification 
efforts. Contraction of the defense industrial base also 
lessens competition and contributes to this problem. The lack 
of detailed cost or pricing data and reduced competition 
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leaves the Government more vulnerable to potential 1Jr~ce 
goug ing by the producer . 
Under this naive approach, the Goverr.ment uses the 
fi=' s reported price and its own demand curve to determine 
the quantity (Q) it will buy. Under these circumstances, the 
monopolist will report a price (RM) that will maximi ze his 
tota l profits. Thus, if the producer assumes the Government 
demand curve is linear and written: 
o " a - bp 
where a and b are parameters of the demand funct ion and P as 
the price, then the monopol ist's prof i t (llM) is represented 
where C i s the actll.al constant marginal cost . 
By differentiating the profit function with respect to 
RM and setting it equal to zero, the profit maximizing leve l 
of RM is found as: 
R " (a~bC) 
M 7.b 
..... hich is al ..... ays greater than the true cost C. 2 The level of 
Government purchase, accordingly, becomes smaller and is given 
o '" ~bC) 
M 2 
The producer's profit IIM may be expressed as: 
IIM '" OM (RM-C) 
II '" (a-bC~ 
M 4b 
The Government's gain for this case is computed as 
GGM '" . 5(~ - RM)OM 
GGM " (a~~c) ~ 
From the Government's point of view, the naive 
approach is undesirable. implies that the monopolistic 
producer will try to set its prices at a profit maximizing 
level, which might be much higher than prices set under 
competitive market conditions. Thus, the Government could pay 
a higher cost, af fo rd fewer i tems, and receive less consumer 
surplus, or Government gain. 
2Note that the vertical intercept of the demand (a/b) 




















In ~979 Loeb and Magat developed a strategy to 
encourage the monopolist to reveal his true cost to the 
regulator. Their truth-revealing strategy was for the 
regulator to pay the producer all of the consumer surplus in 
addition to the producer's reported costs. [Ref . 14] 
Since all the gains from production are transferred to the 
producer, the producer has no incentive to falsify the costs 
or to be inefficient in its production. 
illustrates the Loeb-Magat model. 
Figure 3-2 
Figure 3-3a. shows the reduction in profit (the shaded 
triangle, area abc) when the producer reports his cost as RH, 
higher than his actual cost C. Figure 3-3b. shows the 
reduction in profit (the shaded triangle, area def) when the 
producer reports his costs as Ru lower than his actual cost. 
Thus, the profit maximizing strategy for the producer under 
Loeb-Magat is to report his costs truthfully. 
The price to the Government of obtaining this cost 
information is very high because the Loeb-Magat mechanism 
gives away all of the consumer surplus to the producer. In 
this case, the total cost to the Government would exceed the 
cost under the naive approach. Thus, whi le it would know the 
true cost of the items purchased, the Government is not likely 












C. PRINCIPLES OF BARON-MYERSON 
Like the Loeb-Magat model, the Baron-Myerson model indt:ces 
the producer to reveal his true cost. But, the Baron-Myerson 
model can maximize the gain to the Government. It achieves 
this by providing the producer a special payment structure 
that results in a more elastic effective demand. It then 
provides the producer all of the consumer surplus under this 
more elastic effective demand. The degree of elasticity is 
based on the Government's probability belief of the likely 
costs to the producer. 
1. Uniform Distribution 
When the Government cannot estimate the likely unit 
for the producer, it may resort to using a uniform 
probability distribution. The use of a uniform distribution 
implies that the Government feels that any cost is equally 
likely_ In fact, much of the Baron-Myerson illustration has 
been based on the use of a uniform probability distribution. 
The Government chooses the lower and upper cost values (L, UJ 
based upon its best estimate. If the unit cost for Cis 




then the cUIT.ulative distribution for C, F(C), is given as: 
F,C) = C-L 
U-L 
When the producer reports his cost as R, the 
Government will pay him a unit payment, v(R) , larger than R 
and purchase the amount Q[v(R)]. The level of this exces."I 
payment that maximizes the Government's gain, in turn, is 
affected by the probability belief on C. In general, v (R) is 
written as: 
v(R) = R + 
With a uniform distribution, the unit payment is: 
The quantity the Government purchases is given by: 
Q(v) .. a-b[v(R) f 
] Substituting the unit payment expression v(R) into this 
equation gives a more elastic modified demand curve Q (R) as 





















?o induce the truth-telling on the part of the 
producer , the Government adjusts its initial payment, 
v(R).Q[v(R»), by adding the amount A(R), where A(R) can either 
be positive or negative depending an the value of R and is 
written as: 
A(R) = J:' Q[v(r)Jdr - Q[v(R)] [v(R) - R] 
This adjustment is made so that the government's net 
payment to the contractor becomes just equal to the entire 
area unde r this mare elastic demand curve for the q uantity up 
to OlveR). In this way, the Baron-Myerson model makes use of 
the Loeb -Magat idea of paying full surplus to the producer , 
but based on the "modified" rather than the actual demand. 
This use of a more elastic demand instead of actual demand for 
the payment provides the source of the Government gain . The 
Government payment GP to the contractor under the uniform 
distribution is given as: 
GP==~ +~-~ 
:?B 2 4B 
The Government gain is then the area between the 
actual demand and the modified demand curve and is given as: 
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Since both the original and modified demand cu~es are 
linear across their enti:::-e range, the values for GP and GG 
can also be found geometrically. 
There are situations for which other distribution 
fonns may be more appropriate. The next section explores the 
use of the triangular distribution. In particular, it 
discusses what form of distribution would maximize the 
Government's expected gain when is not sure which 
distribution is indeed true. 
2. Triangular Distribution 
The use of a uniform distribution is generally 
appropriate when the Goverrunent' s knowledge of costs is very 
limited. However, as the Government gains more cost 
information, it may want to use other dis t ribution forms. 
Instead of merely choosing an upper and lower value for the 
possible cos t range, it can select a most likely cost value 
to form a triangular distribution. 
If C has a triangular pdf, then its distribution 
parameters are given by (L,M, rJ), where L is the value at the 
lower endpoint, (L,O), H is the most-likely value 
corresponding to the apex point (M,h) , and U is the upper 
value at the endpoint, (U, 0) . See Figure 3 - 5. 
Since this is a pdf function, the height h, of the 
apex can be expressed as: 
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ftC) ., 
Figure 3 -5 
TRlANGUL ... R DISTRIBUTiON 
pre) 
The s l ope, m, of tr.e pdf function is given by: 
m1 " (M_L)2( U-L ) 
m" - --'--2 (U-L) (U-M) 
for L:<;.C:<;.M 
for M:<;.C:<;.U 
The pdf for C, f(C} , is given by: 
! () =~ m1 C- L (M-L ) (U-L) 




The edf for e, p(e) , is then: 
for L 5. C.;.M 
forM:;,C:r.U 
The unit payment, v(R) , to the contractor, is given 
I 1 . 5R-0. 5£ 
v(R) " l R+~(~U--,,£,,-I ,;"~~;-;;;M'i:'_R",)-"IU,--,,,RI,-' 
for L sRsM 
for MsR.;.U 
Just as with the uniform distribution, the Government 
modifies its demand curve to recapture some consumer surplus 
as Government gain. If the original demand curve is Q= a-bP 
then substituting v(R) for P in the equation gives: 











Figure 3 - 6 







Quantity Q(R) [II Governme:J.IGain E] Government Payment 
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The modified demand is linear in R for L<-R<=M, and becomes 
strictly concave for M< _R<""U. 4 The vertical intercept,R*, 
for the modified demand curve i s found using the quadrat ic 
equation; 
R'''' (2A+4BU) ± yt2A+4BU! - 4 (3B)K, 
68 
where K]= (2aU+bLU+bMU-bLM). 
The Government's payment, GP, then becomes: 
GP"" foQ(V) R (q) dq 
As wi th the uniform distribution case, the Government 
gain GG is found by subtracting the Government payment from 
the area under the original demand curve when the curve is 
integrated from zero to 0 (v): 
4 The inverse demand function R(O} is given by: I (a.,o,sS:')- 1,~b R (q) '" 'I~~~l.I:::TI;~ (2a+4bu-2q) _l.. (2a+4bu-2q) 2-12bK 
6b 
where OM and OL correspond to t he quantity purchased when R .. M 
and R=L respectively. K denotes the value, K"" (2aU+hLU+JlMU-
bLN)-2Uq. 
34 
TRIANGULAR AND UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION RISlI: ANALYSIS 
Suppose the unde.::- l ying cost distribution could either be 
unifo:::1l1 or triangu l ar. Depending upon the Gover!1:nent' s 
experti s e in prediction, there could be four possibi l ities. 
The Government correctly the underlying 
distribution as unitorm or triangular. It can also misforcast 
the distribution as unito:::1l'. when it is triangul ar or vice 
The objective then is to find out it one dis~ribution 
is better than the other when either distribution is equally 
like l y. Can the demand condi t ion influence the choice of 
appropriate distribution that would maximize the Government's 
expected gain? 
1, Expected Gain 
Recognizing that the risk associated with the choice 
ot the pdf, the regulator needs a way to conduct comparative 
analysis. Rather than focus on t he Governrnent gain, a better 
measurement is the Government expected gai n (EG). 7 he EG is 
the value found by integrating t he product of Government gain 
and the corresponding probabi l ity for a l l possible values of 
R. For example, let P(R) be the probability that t he cost 
report is R. Then the Government's expected gain is given as: 
where GGR denotes the Government's gain when the cost report 
is R. 
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2. Expected Gain Comparison 
This analysis focused on risk reduction when choosing 
the pdf for use in the model. The primary objective was to 
determine under what demand conditions, if any, that one 
distribution should be preferred over the other. The choice 
of pdf was restricted to either the uniform or triangular 
distribution. 
a. Methodology 
A linear demand curve of Q .. a-bP was used for 
computation. Six demand scenarios were considered in this 
context, with three scenarios based upon the choice of a and 
three based upon the choice of b. Expected gains were 
computed for all four possible cases in each demand scenario. 
The results were listed in tables for comparison. 
Table 3-1 compares High, Medium, and Low demand 
whi ch corresponds to a=10 , 6, and 5 respectively and a 
constant demand curve slope of 1>=1. Table 3-2 compares 
Steeper, Medium, and Flatter demand, which corresponds to 
1>=0.5, 1, and 2 respectively, with a constant horizontal 
intercept a=lO. 
A base case was based upon the Uniform strategy 
when the demand is High, with Q~~O -P, and the cost 
distribution is uniform, with its range Very Narro w between 
(4 .9,5.1). All other entries in the payoff matrices are 
expressed as percentages of this base value. 
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b. Results 
Table 3 - 1 shows that a dominant strategy exists 
for a demand case with a Very Narrow and Narrow cost range. 
The Triangular pdt dominates regardless of the true state of 
These cases are represented by the shaded cells in 
the tab l e. 
However, as the demand level declines in t erms of 
a and the c os t range widens, this dominance no longer holds. 
In t hese cases, the Uniform strategy performs best it the 
state of nature is in fact uniform. However, choosing the 
Uniform when t he true s tate of nature is triangular, provides 
the wors t expected payoff of the four pOSSibilities. Given 
the true state of nature, the correct estimation increases t!1e 
relative gains. 
In Table 3 - 2 a domir..ant strategy c learly emerges . 
As the elasticity of demand decreases, or becomes steeper, the 
Triangular pdf performs best, whether the true state of nature 
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TABLE 3·1: PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE GOVERNM:ENT AS A FUNCTION OF COST RANGE AND DEMAND LEVEL 
:;: ~ 
Demand I Range2 Narrow Narrow Medium Wide 
Levell I Strategy 
Nature Unif . Tria. unif. Tria. Unif . Tria. Unif. Tria. 
Uniform #)O~j. 1 " ~32t I~",s.~ 2,.3' · 19.8t 19.4t 10.2% 9.7% 
High 
Triangular '>9.\ Ii"'i~.%" l.o6f ·~ •. S\ 20.1% 20.8% 8.9% 9.6% 
Uniform 3.9% 3.8t 1. at 0.92% 1.7% 1. 4% 2.6% 2.1% 
Medium 
Triangular 3.8% 4.0% 0.62% 0.77t 0.81\" 0.87% 1.1%- 1.2% 
Unifontl 0.15% 0.13% 0.14% 0.13% 0.51% 0.43% 1.1%- 0.96 \ 
Low 
Triangular 0 .05% O. 06t O. 03% O. 05% 0.15% 0.18% 0.36% 0.43 % 
1. Three demand levels are considered: High, Medium, Low demand corresponds to 
Q=10 - P, Q",6 - P,and Q_ S _P respectively. 
2. Four cost ranges are considered: Very Narrow, Narrow, Medium, wide. These 
correspond to the ranges of (4.9,5.1), (4,6), (3,7), and (2,8) respectively. The apex 
point of the triangle distribution is set a t f i ve. The mean of the distribution, 
therefore, remains the same for both the uniform and triangle distributions. 
3. This cell represents the base case, and each of the other cells in the payoff 
matrices is expressed as a percentage of this value. Specifical ly, the expected 
Goverrunent gain for this cell represents the resu l t of the Uniform strategy when the 
demand is High with Q_10_P, and when the cost distribution is uniforrn with its range 
Narrow between (4,6). 
Source: NPS Technical Paper, The Optimal Choice of Distributions in the Barop-
Myerson Mechanism, forthcoming paper by K.L. Terasawa and D. Bearden. 
is uniform or t:riaegular. Agdir:, the shaded cells represent 
the region where il dominant strategy exists. 
l'ab l e 3 - 2 also shows the cost range to be an 
impor::.ant factor. As the cost range narrows, the number of 
cases wher.e the Triangular strategy domina'::es increases. For 
exampl e, with the Medium elasticity cases the Triangular 
strategies are dominant when the cost range is Very Narrow or 
Narrow. Conversely, as the cost range becomes Me dium or Wide 
with the Medium elasticity case , there is no dominant 
strategy . 
Conclusion 
The payoff matrices indicate that there is no OIle 
overall dominant strategy when choosing hetween the Triangular 
or uniform pdf. However there are demand circumstances where 
the Triangular strategy becomes dominant . These sitl.:ations 
a re typified by a combination of High demand, Low elasticity, 
and a Narrow or Very Narrow cost range. 
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TABLE 3 -2: PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE GOVERNMENT AS A FUNCTION OF COST RANGE AND DEMA.~D 
ELASTICITy1 
Very 
Demand I Range) ~ Na-r-;ow II Narrow Medium wide 
Elastici ty2 ~
Strategy 




1. Each cell in the matrix represents the ~ gains using the base case discussed 
in table 3-l. 
2. Three demand elastici ty levels are considered: High, Medium, Low which correspond 
to Q_IO_O.SP, Q-IO-p, and Q_10_2P repec tively. for a given level of price, the 
demand elasticity becomes higher as b decreases in a linear demand curve: i. e. 
-aP 
dn/db", (a-bP) <0 
3. The same three cost ranges used in Table 3·1 are used again here. Again the apex 
point of t he triangle d is t ribution is set at five. The mean of the distribution, 
therefore, remains the same for both the un iform and triangle distributions. 
IV. IMPL ICATIONS OF US ING THE MODEL IN DOD PROCUREMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter II, the researcher communicated that an 
important part of acquisition reform is the movement toward a 
price-based procurement system. Chapter III introduced the 
Baron-Myerson model and demonstrated its underlying principles 
for regulating a monopolist, or sole source supplier. If this 
model could be used in DOD procurement, it could offer many 
positive benefits. 
wr.ile adoption of this model by DOD offers potential 
rewards, it is by no means a panacea for all types of sole 
situations. Certain conditions must exist for the 
model to be implemented with favorable results. 
This chapter discusses some of these conditions that must 
be met for the model to work. It also identifies and 
discusses potential concerns about using the model in the 
current DOD procurement environment. 
B. MODEL IMPERATIVES 
It is important to emphasize that the model is not 
feasible for all situations or under all conditions. Certain 
critical criteria must be evaluated to ensure successful 
initiation of the Baron-Myerson model. 
1. Non-Inelastic Demand 
The dynamics of the truth-telling strategy of the 
Ba ron-Myerson model center around the premise that the 
regulator will determine the quantity to buy based upon the 
producer's reported cost. Therefore, the demand must not be 
totally inelastic to the price changes. Instead of a single 
rigid number, the buyer must have a range of acceptable 
purchase quantities. 
2. Regulator Credibility 
It is essential that the Government maintain 
credibility in the eyes of the producer for the model to work. 
There is a certain amount of gamesmanship occurring among the 
participants. The Government's promise to reduce or increase 
the number of items it will buy, based upon the producer's 
reported cost, is the key element that "forces" the contractor 
to tell the truth. Therefore, if the contractor feels the 
Government cannot follow through with its promise, he will 
behave quite differently from the Baron-Myerson predictions. 
The Government must build its credibility through 
steadfast and consistent behavior. This means faithfully 
buying the purchase quantities specified by the rules of the 
model; or maybe not buying any items if the reported cost is 
too high. This may be difficult to do, but is necessary if 
producers are to believe the Government is serious. 
42 
C . DEMAND IN THE DOD PROCUREMENT ENVIRONMENT 
There is concern ~hat the demand for the items DOD b"Jys is 
very inelastic. In some cases this may be t_rue. However, 
there is evidence to suggest that the demand is not always as 
inflexibl e as many would think. The numbers of systems to buy 
are generated through a complex process that is based upon 
detailed analysis. Yet, the process is very political and 
analysis does not always deteI1l1ine the final number.s. 
1. Analytical Base 
The demand for systems in the services are threat 
based and budget constrained. Limi ted resources force 
decision makers to choose between numerous force structure 
options in an attempt to obtain utility maximizing 
combinations. Structured analysis is conducted at many levels 
to provide decision makers with empirical basis for 
deteI1l1ining service requi r.ements. A cursory overview of the 
process used by the AI1l1y is given here as an example. 
The AI1l1y uses Total AI1l1y Analysis (TAA) to prepare its 
budget request for the two year budget cycle. The Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRAnOC) has its TRADOC AnalysiS Command 
(TRAC) and Combined AI1l1S Center (CAC) conduct analysis of 
future force structure needs. The numbers generated by TRAnOC 
go to the office of the Assi s tant Deputy Chief of Staff of 
Operations for Force Development (ADCSOPS {FD)} . 
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There, the ADCSOPS (FD) personnel conduct mission 
analysis to balance the force structure requirements, 
costs, and combat payoffs of the systems and further refine 
t h e numbers. By conducting this trade - off analysis, the 
rr.ission area personnel determine what they feel is required in 
the way of numbers of systems by type. These systems 
requirements are put in order of priority in hopes that the 
numbers can he achieved. 
The priority list with its numbers is further 
reviewed by the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASARDA). Here more 
scrutiny is given to the numbers based on budgetary concerns 
and business factors. Economic order quantitiesS , economic 
sustainment rates, and defense industrial base considerations 
are balanced with the yearly f l ow of funds in current and out 
years. 
Afterwards, final decisions are made and numbers 
are submitted up the decision chain for approval and ultimate 
inclusion into the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). Along 
the way, the CINCS, Chief of Staff, and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense provide input requiring reconsideration 
of t he numbers. 
The process described ahove is not carried out in 
isolation. The Deputy to the ADCSOPS (FD) , COL Hixon, pointed 
SIn fact, the existence and analys i s of economic order 
quantities imply the tradeoff between quantities and price. 
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out that many destabi l i:>:ing factors inf l uence the requirements 
for programs on a day to day basis. The growth of technology 
creates an industrial mismat(":h. The shrinking budget produces 
tar reaching turbulence. Programs run into problems that 
cause cost overruns and schedule delays. There are minimum 
economic sustainment rates and sustainment of the industri a l 
base to consider. 
These elements in the acquisition environment 
force decision makers to change the numbers demanded many 
times a day. There is no analytical tool that can handle all 
ot these tactors at once in an easy tashion. COL Hixon said 
that these dai l y revisions "must be mixed in with a dose ot 
common sense." [Ref. 15J 
These observations seem to indicate that the 
demand is indeed elastic. Even when a target quantity is 
chosen in conjunction with the target price, the quantity 
often changes wit h the changes in the circumstance. Previous 
decisions are often rendered ineffective by many rapidly 
changing externalities; and adjustments in quantities are 
frequently made based on price changes. 
2. Political Influence 
Little mention has been made so far of the political 
forces and their impact on the demand generation process. The 
acquisition arena is full of political inf l uences , both inside 
and outside of DOD. These factional threats force program 
sponsors to be very resolute in defending their c l aimed 
program requirements. 
Having many competing technologies maturing at the 
same time and the goal of fielding them as soon as possible, 
means fierce competition for shrinking procurement funds. 
Presently, DOD cannot fund all of the systems in devel opment 
with the amount of money allocated in the defense budget. The 
fight for funds has bred a culture inside of DOD that forces 
program advocates to staunchly defend the number of systems 
they declare they need. As Richard Doyle, budget professor at 
the Naval Post Graduate School and former Congressional 
staffer said, 
no one is going to say they don't need all of the systems 
they requested earlier, because they know the money will 
be taken away and given to somebody else. 
[Ref. 16J 
This sentiment was shared by a ranking source from the 
office o f the Navy comptroller. The source mentioned that the 
Navy no l onger wanted the original number of a certain type of 
system it was scheduled to buy. Instead it wanted a larger 
number of another type of system. A conscious decision was 
made not to inform the Congress for fear that the Navy would 
lose the money for the systems they woul d give up and would 
not receive it back to buy mo re of the desired systems. 
This attitude of hold on to what you have, instead of 
what might be best, is pervasive. It is a major reason that 
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program sponsors refuse to admit tha t t heir program number is 
not capable of going lower. Yet, amidst a ll the cries that 
the demand is ur.movable, program numbers are reduced almost 
daily, as the budget drops or priorities change. The Army 
Paladin is a prime e xample. I ts original nur:lber started at 
1,700 units. This was reduced to 1,360 units, then to 1,138 
units, and eventually to 824 units. [Ref . 17] 
Even the existence of reduction contingency plans is 
a closely guarded secret. When the Navy source was asked if 
a certain program would be cut if further funding reductions 
occurred, he replied that, " ... we all know that (decrements) 
list does not exist unt i l the cuts are actually made." 
A former member of the ADCSOPS (FD), and primary p layer 
i n the demand decision for the Paladin system, said that i t 
was a closely kep t secret that a plan existed t o vary the 
final number of uni ts bought. Decision makers were going to 
base the final quantity upon the price reported by the 
producer. Although the official number was 824 units, the 
minimum numbe r acceptable wa s 815 units. If the price was 
good, the number could increase up to 835 units, then to 862 
units; with the maximum being 906 units. 
The source also volunteered that the number really 
wanted was 835 units , but 824 units was chosen because it was 
the most "defensible". [Ref. 18] This seems to be 
another important corollary of the political influence on the 
process. The number chosen as the demand must be justifiable 
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to the many adversaries looking for a way to get money from 
the program. The threat is not only from Congress or other 
services. The threat can come from sponsors of other programs 
within the same service. 
CONTRACT TYPES FOR USE WITH THE MODEL 
Given the imperatives listed previously, it is reasonable 
to assume that certain contract types are better candidates 
for using the model than others. 
1. Cost Type Contracts 
The Baron-Myerson model may not be well suited to 
contract situations that normally dictate the use of cost type 
Contracts for procurement of immature technologies 
or RDT&E contracts are two such situations. Under RDT&E 
contracts, only limited numbers of prototype items are 
produced. It is difficult to vary the demand and make use of 
the Baron-Myerson model. 
Another reason is that the contractor may not have a 
firm or reasonable estimate of the actual cost of producing a 
developmental item or an item with immature technol ogy. The 
contractor's reported cost to the regulator could be 
significantly wrong. This prompts the contractor to pad its 
cost estimate to avoid excessive risk under the Baron-Myerson 
model and reduces the potential efficiency gain for the 
Government. 
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Although the model may be more difficult to lise for 
development contracts, its use in the follow-on production 
contract may be a more effective cost reduction incentive than 
those presently used. Assuming that a sale source p roduct 
developer will receive the production contract, early 
introduction of the model will give the contractor st rong 
incentive to design in cost saving features . 
Present: Cost Reduction Incentives 
Present incentives for developmental 
reductions are not necessarily very effective. Government 
contract officers usually assume the contractor is profit 
motivated. Therefore, incentives typically take the form of 
award fees or incentive fees. This system may not always be 
effective in accomplishing cost reductions if contractors look 
ahead to the future profitability of the production contract. 
Companies typically expect to make the larges t 
share of their profit on the follow-on production contract. 
Profit in production contracts is generally figured as a 
percentage of the cost to build the item. As a result , a sole 
source contractor's best option during development might 
actually be to drive the cost of an item up to get a hi g her 
total profit later in the production contract. 
[Ref. 191 
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b_ Baron-Myerson As An Incentive 
Under Baron-Myerson, both the quantity bought and 
the producer's profit become larger as the cost decreases_ 
Therefore, it is in the developer's best interest to design in 
low cost producibility and have the Government buy more items_ 
2 _ Fixed Price Contracts 
The Baron-Myerson model is best suited to procurement 
situations that normally support the use of fixed price type 
contracts because the producer is better aware of his 
production cost. Thus, the Government can be more confident 
that the producer's reported cost estimate will be reasonably 
accurate. 
There are incentives for the Government to use the 
model instead of a typical fixed price contract. Contracting 
officers can currently use market or catalog price to 
determine reasonableness of producer price when the item is 
sold in sufficient quantities to the public. Remembering the 
naive approach, the price charged by a sale source supplier is 
set to maximize profits and is not regulated by competition. 
Thus, the price may be excessively high, even though it is a 
catalog price. ExerCising a model like Baron - Myerson to 
regulate the price could produce substantial savings for the 
Government. 
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E. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR USE OF THE MODEL 
The following section identifies a few examples that might 
support using the Earon-Myerson technique. 
1. Maj or Weapons Systems 
The Earon-Myerson model might not be the best option 
for administering a procurement for major weapon systems that 
have a high unit cost and strong force structure driven 
demand. However, the model should not be immediately ruled 
out as an option. 
There is some flexibility built into the numbers of 
any system. While basic force structures tend to dictate a 
minimum number, areas for flexibility do exist. The number of 
items bought as war reserves, operational readiness floats, 
reserve cycle floats, depot floats, training base and POMCUS 
stocks are flexible to a degree. 
2 • POM Addendums 
These go up to Congress each year as items that the 
services want but cannot afford. Sometimes Congress will 
decide to appropriate some funds towards the purchase of these 
items. One example was the Army's M992 Field Artillery 
Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV). The purchase was one 
where the demand was not critically high. In this case, the 
number bought was largely determined based upon the price of 
the item. [Ref. 18J 
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One aspect that helped remove the economic order 
quanti ty consideration from the decision was that the M992 was 
an adapt ion of the MI09 already in production. Having a warm 
production line allowed additional flexibility s ince the cost 
of starting and stopping a new line for a small production run 
was not a factor. [Ref . 18] 
3. Service Life Extensions Or Midlife Product 
Improvemen ts 
Often, the need to improve the entire fleet is not 
critical because an existing system is already performing the 
task ; i . e. upgrading the electrical systems on the M1A1 heavy 
armored tank . In this case, the tank is performing 
satisfactorily wi th the current system. Upgrading it will not 
significantly increase combat power, but does result in a 
better system. 
4. Congressionally Mandated Awards 
occasionally, Congress will mandate that a particular 
company will receive award of a contract without competition. 
One such case was the Army's purchase of the M16A2 from Colt 
Firearms. Here, there was a suitable weapon in the field 
already, so the rate of replacement was not a critical factor. 
This type of situation eliminates competition as a price 
regulating option. As a result, the model could be used to 
determine the quantity bought. Another example was the MARK 
19 Automatic Grenade Launcher, which was awarded to a Japanese 
owned company, Sako, but built in Florida. [Ref. 18] 
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5. Others 
Any i terns from a commercial sale source where the 
de:nand quantities are not rigidly set. The case of the state -
of· the art encryption radios mentioned in chapter two is a 
good example. 
It.ems that have a long shelf life and need not be 
ordered in specific quantities are also potential candidates. 
Inventory type items, ordered on a periodic basis may provide 
conditions necessary for use of the model. As an example, The 
PEO of armaments stated that the quantity of tank main gun 
rounds was not difficult to change if money became a 
problem. [Ref. 20] 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter pointed out that the Baron-Myerson model is 
not applicable to all situations. Certain conditions must be 
satisfied for the model to work well. Notably, there must be 
some flexibility in the demand numbers, so that the regulator 
can stick to his promise to purchase the number of systems 
indicated by the mode l . Additional l y, the regulator must 
maintain credibili ty in the eyes of the producer to induce him 
to report his costs truthfully. 
While the demand in DOD is portrayed to be analytically 
based and very inflexible, the frequent changes to the numbers 
as a result of funding cuts, or due to political reasons, 
indicate that some flexibility does exist. Even with major 
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weapon systems there is a range of acceptable numbers to some 
extent. However, as the criticality of need for an iter:! 
rises, the viability of using the model diminishes. 
The model may not be wel l suited to cost typ e cont r acts 
due to uncertainty of costs, even on part of the producer. 
Yet, it could provide cost reduction incentives during 
development of systems. The real benefits of t he r:1.odel are 
bes t realized in a situation that would call for a fixed price 
t ype contract where the producer better knows his costs. 
Finally, there seem to be areas where DOD could use the 
model. Some example cases were proposed to illustrate that 
possible uses for the model do exist. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following are conclusions that apply to this research 
effort. 
Potential benefits can be realized if DOD can adopt 
the Baron-Myerson model. Foremost , the model could offer a 
technique to maintain the public trust and protect taxpayer 
interests in a price-based procurement system under sale 
s ource condi tions . Additionally, CAS and TINA requirements 
could be loosened, allowing commercial vendors with advanced 
proprietary technology easier access to the DOD marketplace . 
Reducing requirements would also mean less capital and 
personnel overhead burden for both the Government and vendor. 
Shortened acquisition cycle times are another possibility. 
2. When the distribution options are unifonn or 
triangular, the risk associated with choosing the underlying 
distribution can be reduced to some degree through 
comparative analysis. The expected gain matrices show that 
certain conditions exist under which use of the triangular 
distribution is conclusively better than use of the unifonn 
distribution. In other situations, the comparison between the 
two distributions is not as conclusive. Having this method 
for comparing the EGs of the distributions u nder different 
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conditions allows the regulator to pick the most risk averse 
strategy with the information at hand. 
3. Certain conditions must exist for the model to be 
implemented with favorable results. The Baron -Myerson model 
is not a "silver bullet" that is applicable to all situations. 
Specifically, the more critical the need for the item, the 
more inflexible is the demand and the less viable is the 
model. 
Some example cases for possible use of the model were 
given in chapter four. This list is by no means 
comprehensive. Any situation where competition is restricted 
and the conditions already mentioned exist might benefit from 
the use of the model_ The important thing is that the 
regulator know what these conditions are and recognize when 
they are present. 
It appears that the demand in DOD is portrayed 
being less inflexible than it truly The frequent 
reduction and second guessing of weapon system quantities, 
even after a l l of the analysis, casts doubt upon the 
contention that the numbers are immovab l e. Furthermore, the 
zero-sum culture created by the competition for funds tends to 
inject a kind of artificial zeal into the protection of the 
numbers of items requested . Finally, it presently seems as 
though having a justifiable or defensible number is 
important than achieving efficiency in many cases. The 
Paladin case provides a good example_ 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Continue to explore the use of the Baron-Myerson model 
in conjunction with acquisition reforms. If DOD is to use the 
model for procurement:, further study of the impact: that 
current legislation, such as the Competition In Contracting 
Act, Truth in Negotiations Act, and Cost Accounting Standards, 
has on the model must be carried Ollt to integrate it into the 
process. This study must necessarily lead to modifications or 
waivers to existing legislation to allow the practitioners 
freedom to implement the model. 
The Department Of Defense should look into conducting 
a pilot program on a small scale to observe the model in llse. 
This would allow a low risk method to evaluate the mode l 's 
potential for more widespread use. It would a lso provide a 
nucleus of trained personnel to help educate others on how to 
use this model. 
c. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Q: Could the Baron-Myerson model be used in DOD 
procurement as a price regulating tool under a price-
based procurement process? 
The model should be studied in greater detail before 
this questi on can be answered emphatically. Yet, there do 
seem to be indicators that the model could work if applied 
selectively and under the correct conditions. And, it does 
seem as though the necessary conditions for the model's use 
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exist on some scale in DOD . There are, however, many barriers 
to its use in the c urrent system, to include present statutes 
and deeply ingrained cultural nonns. It will take a great 
effort to build a coalition large or powerful enough to push 
an idea like this through the system. Even so, the potential 
benefits offered by this model warrant additional effort in 
this direction. 
Q: What conditions or parameters detennine the best 
distribution to use between the uniform or triangular 
distribution? 
There was no overall best strategy for risk reduction 
when choosing the pdf. However, when the cost range is 
narrow, the demand level high, and the demand curve steeper, 
or less elas t ic, the triangular distribution tends to dominate 
regardless of the true underlying distribution. When these 
conditions do not exist with another, then there is 
usually no dominant strategy. 
Q: What conditions are necessary for best use of the 
model? 
A; The model will work best when two primary conditions 
are satisfied: 
• The demand for an item is not inflexible; 
• The characteristics of the item are such that the producer 
can accurately estimate his opportunity cost of making the 
item . 
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Q : Do favorable conditions e xist in the DOD procurement 
system for use of the Baron-Myerson model? 
A: Given the decrease in size of the defense industry base 
and the resulting reduction in competition in some areas, 
there seems to be enough potential benefit for DOD to consider 
using the model. It does appear that the demand for some if 
not many items purchased by DOD is not as rigidly set as many 
would suggest. Wnile the model is not best for all 
situations, there are cases that meet the necessary conditions 
to use the model. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
lI.reas that merit further research follow. 
1 . The use of other distributions can be studied to 
provide additional options besides the uniform and triangular 
distributions. 
2. Analysis of the model under conditions of repetitive 
buys and their effect on contractor behavior warrants further 
study. Contractors may react differently to the Government's 
demand curve if he has motives other than profit i n the near 
These might include maintaining a warm production 1 ine 
or seeking to optimize his use of production capacity over 
time. 
3. Further work can be done on conducting a sensitivity 
analysis for the regulator's cost estimate. The regulator's 
modified demand curve is a function of its estimate of the 
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producer ' s opportuni ty cost of the item. Thus, a sensitivity 
analysis wou l d be useful in dete:rnlining the cost/benefit of 
obtaining additional information . 
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